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History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn 
from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. 
The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program and at the 
beginning of a new and untested program. The information that we gain through failure 
analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of 
vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in 
the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, 
mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failure analyses and accident 
investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Space 
Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This 
paper will explore a variety of failure case studies at the Kennedy Space Center and the 
lessons learned that can be applied in future programs. 
I. Introduction 
FAILURE analysis at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is performed on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for all of the programs that operate at the center. The failures analyzed by the Materials Science 
Division include metal\urgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failures. The fundamental goal of 
the analysis is to determine the root cause of the failure in order to prevent future failures. The majority of failures 
can typically be attributed to one or more of the following causes: failure due to fabrication problems; failure due to 
environmental problems; failure due to maintenance and processing problems; and failure due to design problems. 
The proper fabrication of hardware is of fundamental importance to the success of the component. Several 
failures have been analyzed where a part has received an inadequate heat treatment, improper coating, or 
unauthorized material substitution. The failures that occur due to fabrication problems typically become evident 
early in the materials evaluation. Whereas many problems can be prevented through a quality assurance program, 
some problems are not apparent until failure occurs under service conditions. 
The location of KSC is an impetus for failure due to corrosion and other environmental problems. The 
combination of the salt from the Atlantic Ocean along with the heat, humidity, and sunlight has resulted in the Beach 
Corrosion Test Site at KSC to be documented as the most corrosive test site in the United States l . In addition to the 
natural environment, the chemical propUlsion used in the Space Shuttle solid rocket boosters results in hydrochloric 
acid deposition onto launch structures and ground support equipment, which accelerates the rate of corrosion at the 
launch pads. 
Subjecting components to their design-intended loads and maintaining these components properly can be a 
challenge at KSC. The service requirements of some of the components and structures are beyond those seen 
anywhere else in the world, and the work cannot be done in a clean room environment. Whether a refractory 
material that must withstand the blast of a launch, or a crawler transporter that carries a twelve-million pound 
vehicle assembly and mobile launcher platform to the launch pad, the proper maintenance of the components is vital 
to ensuring mission success. 
The design of a component is a critical factor in its success throughout the lifetime of the part. Most components 
will ultimately perform their designed functions. However, the design process may sometimes fail to take into 
account certain factors, such as accessibility for maintenance and inspection, which can eventually lead to failure. 
Additionally, over a 30 year program, modifications to the original design can lead to unintended consequences that 
result in failure. 
The failures that occur at KSC are typically a combination of the presented factors with the factor of age playing 
a large role. The Space Shuttle program is now almost 30 years old, and much of the flight hardware and ground 
support equipment are original to the program. Additionally, some of the ground support equipment that was used 
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during the Apollo program is currently in use today. KSC has been directed to update the launch infrastructure, 
which could present different sources of failure. By studying historical failures and learning the lessons that they 
present, NASA can have a higher rate of mission success in future programs. 
n. Case Studies 
A. Failure Due to Fabrication Problems2 
International Space Station (LSS) materials and processes engineering personnel submitted a payload canister rail 
from the Rotation Handling Fixture when a crack was observed on the top of the rail during installation. The 
Rotation Handling Fixture is used to lift the modules of the ISS into a vacuum chamber in order to perform leak 
checks. The drawing specified that the rail be 
composed of AISI 4140 steel (UNS G41400). 
Fig. J shows the payload canister rail , as received. 
The blue arrows indicate the six notches that are 
cut into the top of the rail in order to fit a thrust 
block assembly used to secure the payload to the 
rail. The yellow arrow indicates the location of 
the crack (inset). Two apparent weld repairs were 
observed in the locations indicated by the red 
arrows. The distance between the weld repair 
regions and their closest notches was 
approximately equal to the distant between 
adjacent notches, which is equal to 10 cm. The 
rail was sectioned longitudinally in order to 
remove the top ledge from the base of the rail so 
that examination of the underside of the ledge 
could be performed. Four cracked regions were 
Figure 1. Payload canister rail, as received, with an 
inset image of the crack on the top of the rail. Scales are 
in cm increments. 
observed on the underside of the ledge near the weld repair regions. 
The crack was opened using an Instron tensile tester in a three-point bend loading configuration in order to 
examine the fracture surface. Corrosion product covered the majority of the revealed surfaces, as shown in Fig. 2. 
The corrosion product was removed in order to reveal the features on the surface. The surfaces were flat and only 
IIh_lu(:eJ Irad ll lt: 
had a small region of fracture around the edge of 
the surface that was approximately I to 2 mm wide. 
Plating was observed on one of the revealed 
surfaces (Fig. 2, bottom right). The other surface 
displayed tools marks that appeared to be the result 
of a machining and grinding operation (Fig. 2, top 
right). 
Analysis of the fracture surface via scanning 
electron microscope (SEM) revealed tool marks on 
both of the surfaces. Examination of the fracture 
region around the edge of both of the surfaces 
revealed dimples formed by microvoid coalescence 
(MVC), characteristic of ductile stress overload. 
Analysis of the bulk metal surface with 
qualitative/semi-quantitative energy dispersive 
spectroscopy via the SEM (SEM/EDS) confirmed 
the presence of nickel plating on one of the 
revealed surfaces. 
Metallographic specimens were prepared from 
Figure 2. Stereomicroscope images of the revealed 
service fracture. 
cross sections of the un fractured weld repair 
region. Initial observation of the metallographic specimens after etching indicated that a piece of different material 
was welded into a notch cut in the base material and that the weld had penetrated less than 3 mm, as shown in Fig. 3. 
The size of the notch correlated with the size of the machined notches that were located in six positions on the rail in 
order to install the thrust block. On the underside of the rail ledge, the weld did not fuse the fill piece with the base 
metal. 
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Metallographic specimens were also prepared from cross-sections of the fractured weld region. Macroscopic 
examination of the metallographic specimens indicated that cold-work lines parallel to the fracture surface were 
present on the fill material, which would 
indicate that the bar was cut from a larger plate 
of material and the material was inserted such 
that the transverse cross-section was sustaining 
the load. Metallographic analysis of the 
samples confirmed the stereomicroscope and 
SEM findings that plating was present on the 
bulk metal surface and the fracture surface was 
limited to a small region on the edge of the 
specimen. The weld used to hold the piece of 
fill materials in the notch also had significant 
porosity. 
Microscopic examination of the bulk metal 
metallographic specimen indicated that the base 
microstructure was ferrite and pearlite 
dendrites. The heat-affected zone (HAZ) had a 
progressive microstructure of ferrite and 
Figure 3. Cross-sections of the weld repair region 
showing a piece of metal inserted into the rail (left) with 
an incomplete weld around the edge (right, arrow). 
untempered martensite and plate martensite showing the prior austenite grain boundaries. The fusion zone structure 
was ferrite with martensite/austenite/carbides (MAC). The microstructures found in the bulk metal were typical for 
a 4140 steel weld. 
Microscopic examination of the fill material metallographic specimens revealed that the base microstructure was 
coarse grain ferrite and pearlite. The HAZ had a progressive microstructure of spheroidized pearlite in ferrite, ferrite 
and martensite in refined prior austenite grain boundaries, and ferrite and martensite in coarse prior austenite grain 
boundaries. The fusion zone structure was ferrite with MAC. The microstructures found in the fill material were 
typical for welded plain carbon steel. 
Microhardness measurements were taken on the metallographic specimens prepared from the cross-sections of 
the fracture surface and were converted3 to the Rockwell B scale (HRB). The converted hardness of the bulk metal 
averaged 92 HRB. The converted hardness of the fill metal averaged 82 HRB, which is significantly less than the 
hardness of the bulk rail metal. The hardness of the bulk metal from the rail met the drawing requirements; 
however, the hardness of the fill metal was less than the required hardness of the rail. 
Chemical analysis determined that the bulk metal was AIS) 4140 steel (UNS G41400), which was in accordance 
with the drawing. The fill material was determined to likely be a 1000-series steel and most closely matched AISI 
1030 steel (UNS G 1 0300). 
The payload canister rail failed due to improper fabrication techniques. The rail had two cut notches that were 
not in accordance with the drawing, and thereby were filled with a low-strength, 1000-series steel. The grinding 
marks on the fill material surface indicate that the cut piece of materials was ground in order to fit into the miscut 
notch. The weld around the steel bar that was used to fill the slot did not have adequate penetration to fuse the fill 
material with the bulk rail metal. The lack of fusion was the most pronounced on the underside of the rail and acted 
as crack initiation points. The rail subsequently failed due to stress overload. 
B. Failure Due to Environment Problems4 
Sections of wire rope that had been used as lightning protection at the launch pads were submitted for damage 
inspection to determine potential future usage of similar wire rope for future programs. The samples were pull-
tested as part of a separate investigation, and were subsequently submitted for evaluation of any service damage. 
The wire rope was reportedly type 316 stainless steel (UNS S31600), 6x 19 right regular lay, with a 7x7 independent 
wire rope core (IWRC), installed in 2001 and removed in 2008. 
Portions of the wire rope were photographed both in the field prior to pull testing and as received after pull 
testing. The majority of the ropes fractured at the swage fittings that were used to loop the wire ropes for pull 
testing. The fitting acted as a stress concentration due to the clamping of the fitting onto the wire rope. However, 
one sample fractured during pull testing at a damaged location on the wire rope and not at the swage fitting location. 
Visual observation of the wire rope revealed damage that was due to two separate environmental problems: 
corrosion and possible lightning damage. 
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I. Damage due to lightning 
Several areas of damage were observed on the surface of the wire rope that were apparent localized melted and 
Figure 4. SEM image (top) and cross-section 
(bottom) of the wire rope. 
fused wires. Orange corrosion product was observed on 
the wire rope in the areas of the melting damage. The 
one pull test sample that did not fail at the swage fitting 
failed at one of the areas of apparent melting damage. 
SEM examination of one of these areas of damage 
observed via stereomicroscope revealed a melted bead 
of metal that formed during a localized heating event, as 
shown in Fig. 4 (blue arrow). 
One of the areas of apparent melting and 
resolidification was cross sectioned and prepared for 
metallographic examination, as shown in Fig. 4 (yellow 
line). Observation of the cross-section indicated that 
five of the nineteen wires in the strand were damaged. 
The area of interest had a typical weld-like dendritic 
microstructure, confirming that the material had been 
melted and resolidified, as illustrated in Fig. 4 (red inset 
image). The base metal consisted of extremely fine 
austenitic grains in the transverse direction. The etchant 
preferentially reacted with the melted and resolidified 
metal, indicating that it is more prone to chemical attack 
than the original wire rope material , as confirmed 
through the observation of corrosion product in these damaged areas. 
Microhardness measurements were taken on the wire rope cross-section. No significant hardness difference was 
noted in the wires near the damaged areas as compared to the rest of the wires, which indicates that the heat affected 
zone of the damaged area was very small. 
2. Damage due to corrosion 
Visual and stereomicroscopic inspection of the fractured wires in one of the ropes revealed pitting of the interior 
of several of the wires, as shown in the top left image in 
Fig. 5. Approximately one quarter of the wires in one 
strand had reduced cross-sectional areas due to the pitting. 
SEM observation of these wire indicated that the pitting 
was not limited to the exterior of the wires, and in some 
cases, the corrosion process preferentially attacked the 
interior of the wires, leading to a wormhole-like 
appearance. 
The pitted wire sample was analyzed using EDS via 
the SEM. Spherical deposits containing aluminum and 
chlorine were observed within the pit, as shown in Fig. 5 
(circled), which are typical of solid rocket booster (SRB) 
combustion product deposit. The corrosion product 
consisted primarily of oxygen, iron, and chromium with 
minor amounts of both chlorine and sulfur. The corrosion 
was likely due to chloride-induced pitting of the stainless 
steel wire from the chlorine-containing SRB deposition 
and from the marine environment. 
One of the pitted wires was mounted and 
metallographically prepared to observe the longitudinal 
cross-section of the wire. Approximately two-thirds of the 
interior portion of the cross-section was pitted, as shown 
Figure 5. The pits observed via stereomicroscope 
(top left) were determined via SEM (bottom image) 
and EOS (spectrum) to contain SRB deposition 
(circled). The cross-section of the wire was 
reduced due to pitting (top right). 
in the top right image in Fig. 5. The grain structure of the wire was extremely elongated due to cold-working. The 
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grain boundary attack caused the wormhole-like pitting of the interior of the wire since the corrosion mechanism 
acted longitudinally with the grain structure. In other words, the directionality of the grains due to cold working 
influenced the directionality of the pitting process, leading to wormhole-like pitting of the wire. 
The metallurgical evaluation of the wire rope used at the launch pad as part of the lightning protection system for 
eight years revealed localized damage due to two different environmental factors. The localized nature of the 
damage in both cases would likely not affect the overall strength of the wire rope because only one quarter of the 
wires in one of the strands was damaged. Inspection of the wire rope would reveal the lightning strike damage areas 
because they occur on the surface of the wire rope; however, the pitting of the interior of the wires would be more 
difficult to detect through visual inspection. 
C. Failure Due to Processing and Maintenance Problems5 
A spherical bearing from a steering cylinder of the crawler transporter (CT) was submitted for failure analysis 
when a crack was observed 
during maintenance. The 
crawler transporter is used to 
transport the shuttle 
transportation system to the 
launch pad after mating 
operations in the Vehicle 
Assembly Building (V AB). The 
spherical bearing assumes the 
horizontal load during the 
steering of one of the four 
individual truck assemblies. 
The drawing specifies that the 
spberical bearing be composed 
of A1S1 E 52100 bearing steel 
(UNS G52986). Fig. 6 shows 
the location of the steering 
cylinder (blue arrow) and the 
Figure 6. Image of the CT in the storage field (left) showing the steering 
cylinder (blue arrow) and the location of the cracked bearing (red arrow). 
The crack was observed on the surface of the spherical bearing (right, 
yellow arrow). 
location of the cracked bearing (red arrow). 
The bearing was photographed as-received to document the location of the crack on the bearing, as shown in Fig. 
6. A lubrication groove was located around the circumference of the spherical bearing. The bearing was submitted 
for nondestructive evaluation (NDE) by liquid penetrant and magnetic particle examination in order to extent of the 
Laboratory·induced 
overload fracture 
:! cm 
Figure 7. The revealed fracture surface displayed crack 
arrest marks (yellow lines). 
indicate that the failure was progressive, as shown in Fig. 7. 
which was located on the weak axis of the spherical bearing. 
cracking. The crack tip was located just below 
the lubrication groove. A witness mark was 
observed on the interior surface of the spherical 
bearing, directly across from the location of the 
crack. The witness mark was more pronounced 
on the lower portion of the spherical bearing, 
indicating that uneven pressure was applied to the 
spherical bearing. 
The spherical bearing was sectioned and the 
crack was opened in order to reveal the service 
fracture surface. The fracture surface was coated 
with grease and had a burnt odor when it was 
opened, evidence that the bearing was in 
operation subsequent to crack formation. The 
fracture surface was cleaned ultrasonically and 
visually examined and the fracture surface 
displayed conchoidal crack-arrest lines that 
The blue arrow indicates the location of the origin, 
Analysis of the fracture surface via SEM revealed mainly intergranular fracture features with localized areas of 
microvoid coalescence (MVC). The fracture surface also had smeared regions and corrosion product, which are 
further indications that the bearing was in service subsequent to fracture. Qualitative/semi-quantitative EDS 
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analysis via the SEM indicated that the corrosion product consisted primarily of iron and oxygen with minor 
amounts of silicon and sulfur. Although no microscopic indication of fatigue striations were observed, the fracture 
features were consistent with progressive failure in high strength steel. 
Metallographic specimens were prepared from cross sections of the fracture surface. The fracture surface 
showed intergranular features with secondary cracks emanating from the fracture surface. The microstructure 
consisted of tempered martensite with evenly dispersed undissolved carbide particles and manganese sulfide 
stringers, typical for high strength bearing steel. SEM/EDS analysis confirmed that the dark colored particles were 
manganese sulfide. Converted3 through-thickness microhardness measurements taken on the metallographic 
specimens averaged 56 Rockwell C scale (HRC), meeting the specified 55 HRC minimum. 
Lubricant samples from two different bearing locations and from the tube of unused grease were submitted for 
analysis. The lubricant from the failed bearing location had been changed during installation of the new bearing, so 
the sample from this location was a mixture of unused grease and grease at the time of failure . A sample was also 
taken from cylinder bearing that had not been changed in order to analyze a typical operational sample. A sample of 
unused grease was taken from the container that was supplied by the technicians who indicated that it was used 
during bearing maintenance. Both of the used samples were a darker brown color than the unused sample and were 
heavily contaminated with particles, which degrades the lubricity of the grease. 
The samples were analyzed for oxidation with Fourier transformed infrared spectroscopy (FT-IR) and for water 
content with the Karl Fischer Test. The FT-IR results confirmed that all of the samples were lithium base soap type 
grease consistent with the composition of the specified grease. The Karl Fischer test results indicated that the grease 
had absorbed water during service, typical for this type of grease. The unused sample displayed elevated water 
content above the optimum initial content, which could be due to age and exposure during storage. 
Qualitative/semi-quantitative SEM/EDS analysis of particles extracted from both of the used grease samples 
indicated that the grease was contaminated with several metallic and nonmetallic particles. The compositions of the 
various particles were consistent with corrosion product and environmental contaminants such as sand and rock 
fragments. 
The lubricant analysis indicated severe degradation due to age and contamination with environmental partic les. 
Also, macroscopic indications of misalignment were found on the interior wall of the spherical bearing. The bearing 
failed in a progressive manner, likely the result of misalignment, with periods of fast crack growth corresponding to 
cycles of large applied loads. The misalignment could be caused by the failure of the grease to properly transfer the 
load, leading to the bearing binding in its race. 
D. Failure Due to Design Problems6 
During installation of the new launch pad lightning protection towers for the Constellation program, inspectors 
found toe cracks along a total of nine 
welds on all three of the towers at 101·11. 3-in . level 
various elevations. Cracking occurred 
along one third or less of the perimeter 
of each weld between the 10-in. 
diameter main horizontal pipe joining 
two 8-in. diameter bracing pipes, 
which are shown in Fig. 8. A 
representative coupon sample was 
removed from one of the towers at the 
10 I-ft, 3-in. elevation crack area for 
analysis. Temperature measurements 
were taken during cutting operations 
to ensure that the part was not over-
heated such that no microstructural 
101·ft. 3·in . levol 
38-ft. 9·in. level ,-
Figure 8. Images of the partially assembled lightning towers at the 
launch pad. 
changes were induced. The pipes were specified as ASTM A 500 Grade B carbon steel. Photodocumentation, 
stereomicroscopy, SEM analysis, chemical analysis and metallography were performed on three specimens created 
from the removed coupon to determine the cause of weld toe cracking. 
After initial photodocumentation, a sectioning plan was formulated to create cross-sectional samples for 
stereomicroscopy, metallography, fractography , and chemical analysis. During sectioning of Specimen I shown in 
Fig. 9, the through-crack was exposed to reveal corrosion product on the fracture surface. Specimen 2, which was 
opened during analysis creating a laboratory-induced overload region, revealed that the crack surface extended to 
the inner diameter (lD) of the 10-in. pipe and tapered off, as illustrated in Fig. 9, bottom right. No paint was 
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observed on the fracture surface, indicating that the crack had initiated after painting and had propagated to its full 
extent before the coupon was taken, with enough time to allow corrosion product to form . 
The fracture surfaces of Specimen I 
were evaluated via SEM at higher 
magnifications as part of a fractographic 
analysis. Each surface was ultrasonically Cldck 
cleaned to remove the majority of the 
corrosion product that had formed on the 
surface. The fracture surface near the IO-in. 10·in. di • . p ipe 
pipe outer diameter (00) contained both 
intergranular and transgranular crack 
propagation features with evidence of brittle 
and ductile (mixed-mode) fracture. 
Intergranular (IG) crack propagation regions 
were surrounded by regions of transgranular 
crack growth. Microvoid coalescence 
(MVC), indicative of ductile stress overload, 
was observed near the ID of the pipe. 
Further evaluation was performed on the 
Specimen 2 fracture surface, which 
exhibited crack propagation demarcations. 
It was determined that the demarcations 
10·in. pipe 00 f-----':.:...::..::.:...c:---'-----"', ]-:;~:::;;;;;;:;;;;;:;;;;'i 10· in . pipe 00 
Laboratory" 
10·in . pipe 10 ::::=====--__ ---' E~~~~:..:.:::J 10. in pipe 10 
10mm 
Figure 9. Removed coupon, as received (top), showing the 
location of the two samples that were opened for 
fractographic analysis (bottom images). 
were not beach marks typically associated with progressive crack growth during fatigue; rather the marks were due 
to superficial corrosion product build-up on the fracture surface. The secondary electron (SE) image did not show 
fatigue striations or plastic transgranular deformation normally observed around the site of a beach mark. At higher 
magnification, SE analysis appeared to show a slight change in fracture features from IG to MVC. Additionally, the 
backscatter electron (BSE) image exhibited atomic contrast due to the presence of corrosion product forming the 
curved lines (darker regions) which was verified by energy dispersive spectroscopy (EOS). It is expected that this 
crack 
imtlation weld bead 
Heat Affe<ted 
lone/HAl) 
base metal 
(ASTMA500. 
Grade B) 
Figure 10. Micrographs of the cross-section of the weld 
showing the crack at the toe of the weld. 
failure was due to overload with a 
geometrical stress state constraint, which 
prevented the material to plastically deform 
resulting in a mixed-mode fracture with a 
large percentage of brittle fracture features. 
According to the ASM Handbook, Vol. 12, 
"when a change in the fracture mode does 
occur as a result of a triaxial state of stress ... 
the mode of rupture can change from the 
normal dimple rupture to quasi-cleavage or 
intergranular decohesion.,,7 
A third specimen was extracted and a 
cross section was mounted, polished, and 
etched to reveal the weld bead, heat affected 
zone, and base metal microstructure. 
Metallography showed the crack initiating 
near the toe of the IO-in. pipe weld at the joint 
transition where a stress concentration was 
expected due to weld geometry, as shown in 
the left image of Fig. 10. The crack propagated mostly perpendicular to the weld near through-thickness and 
deviated at a 45° angle I mm from the lD of the IO-in. pipe, as shown in the right image of Fig. 10. The cross 
section exhibited acceptable microstructures for the heat-affected zone (HAZ), weld metal, and base metal as 
expected for a plain carbon steel fillet weld. Microstructure and crack morphology indicated that this failure was 
neither due to hydrogen-induced cracking nor other types of materials-related fracture. 
Chemical analysis via optical emission spectroscopy indicated that the average carbon content for both the 8-in. 
pipe and the IO-in. pipe met the specification8 and that the chemistry of the pipes was nominal. Microhardness 
measurements using a Knoop indenter were converted3 to the Rockwell B scale (HRB). The converted hardness 
values indicated that the mechanical properties of the pipes were within the specification8. 
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The crack profile and fractography indicated that the joint failed due to stress overload. The lack of paint on the 
fracture surface indicated that the crack occurred after painting. Heavier oxidation on the fracture near the 10-in. 
pipe ID, rather than the origin at the 00, indicates that moisture had wicked into the fracture and settled over time. 
Weld features and geometry appeared nominal. No weld discontinuities or defects were observed. Fracture 
initiated at a transition near the toe of the weld, a region of stress concentration, and propagated inward through the 
base metal rather than following the weld HAZ. Microstructure, hardness, and fracture features did not indicate a 
hydrogen-induced failure mechanism. No other failure mechanisms related to the material were observed. 
Loading configuration of this joint design should be evaluated to determine if the joint was overloaded, with the 
weld toe considered to be a significant point of stress concentration. Future assembly operations should eliminate 
the possibility of stress overload during fit-up and existing cracks should be repaired. 
The reasoning behind the categorization of this failure is more due to the lessons learned from this failure. After 
completion, the lightning towers stand 500 feet tall with 100 foot high fiberglass masts. The only access to the 
lightning tower is with a rung ladder on one side of each tower, with four walkways approximately every 125 feet. 
Routine inspection and maintenance of the towers and the welds, along with troubleshooting of any problems that 
may arise, will be difficult with the current access configuration, which should be taken into account at the 
beginning of a new long-term program. 
III. Conclusion - The Role of Age in Failure at KSC 
One factor that plays a role in every failure analysis and is one of the first questions asked in the course of an 
investigation is the age of the component. The failure of a new part may indicate a problem with the design or 
fabrication of a component. The failure of a part that is 20 years or older may signify a problem with maintenance. 
In several cases, age itself can be the cause of the failure; for example in many cases where fatigue or corrosion is 
the failure mechanism, only routine inspection and replacement can mitigate these failures prior to larger system 
failure . 
A survey of jobs performed over the past three years by the NASA Materials Failure Analysis section was 
completed in order to determine the distribution 
of component age at failure. So far, over 50 
failure analysis cases have been reviewed, and 
the distribution of component age is shown in 
Fig. II. For some of the ground support 
equipment at KSC, documentation of the age is 
not available, especially when the component 
has been in service for over 20 years. These 
cases have not been incorporated into the 
distribution at this time in order to perform 
further research to determine the age of the 
components. 
Over the past three years, the Materials 
Failure Analysis section has performed failure 
analysis for components with an average 
service life of 17.5 years for cases where the 
age of the component was known and that the 
• New (less than 3 months ) 
- Less than 5 years 
- 5-9 years 
- 10-14years 
- 15-19 years 
- 10 years and OYer 
Figure 11. Distribution of the ages of failures over the past 
three years in the KSC Materials Failure Analysis section. 
component was not new (less than 3 months old). Over one third of the failure analysis cases are for new hardware 
and over one third of the failure analysis cases are for hardware that is over 20 years old. At this time a true 
statistical distribution of the component age at failure cannot be determined until further data are collected over a 
greater time period, which will be completed in a future study. However, the expected distribution of failure age is 
close to a bimodal distribution with the preponderance of failures occurring either at the beginning of the life-cycle 
due to design or fabrication problems, or many years later when the component becomes susceptible to age-related 
failures. 
In spite of the limitations of the current survey, the results have implications for the present state of work at 
KSC. The Shuttle program has been in operation for almost 30 years, and the age of the hardware and ground 
support equipment is at one of the peaks for failure . As the Shuttle program concludes and new programs begin at 
KSC, the need for failure analysis is at its most critical point on two fronts . With vigilant failure analysis, NASA 
can obviate failure and continue flying safely. 
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Introduction • 
• Failures can occur in every engineering endeavor, 
and what we learn from those failures contributes 
to . th~ knowledge base to safely complete future 
Ill1SSlons. 
• The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at 
the end of one aged program and at the beginning 
of a new and untested program. 
• The information that we gain through failure 
analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current 
vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles 
more efficient and safe. 
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Types of Failure 
• The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation 
Branch in the Materials Science Division at the 
Kennedy Space Center. 
- Metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials 
failure analyses and accident investigations. 
- Flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Shuttle, 
International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services 
Programs. 
• The majority of failures can typically be attributed to 
one or more of the following causes. 
- Failure due to fabrication problems. 
- Failure due to environmental problems. 
- Failure due to maintenance problems. 
- Failure due to design problems. 
Case Study: Failure due to Fabrication . 
• The Rotation Handling Fixture is 
used to lift the modules of the 
ISS into a vacuum chamber in 
order to perform leak checks. 
• A payload canister rail from the 
Rotation Handling Fixture was 
submitted for failure analysis 
when a crack was observed on 
the top of the rail during 
installation 1. 
• The rail was specified as AISI 
4140 steel. 
ISalazar, V.L. . "Suspect Crack lndical ioos in Payload Canister Trunmon Support Fillmg$:' 
R I KSC·MSL·2006-0409, 2006. 
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Case Study: Failure due to Fabrication 
• The failure surfaces were flat and only 
had small regions of fracture around 
the edge of the surface. 
- Plating was observed on one of the surfaces. 
- The other surface displayed tools marks that 
appeared to be the result of a machining and 
grinding operation. 
• Metallographic specimens were 
prepared from cross sections of the 
rail. 
- A piece of metal was welded into a notch cut 
in the base material. 
- The fill material was determined to be a 
lOOO-series steel. 
- The size of the fill material was the same 
size as machined notches that were located 
in six positions on the rail. 
Case Study: Failure due to Fabrication 
• The pay load canister rail failed due to 
improper fabrication techniques. 
- Six cut notches were located on the rail, which 
were intended for installation of the thrust block 
used to secure the payload to the rail. 
- The rail had two cut notches that were not in 
accordance with the drawing, and were then 
filled with a low-strength, lOOO-series steel and 
welded into place. 
• The rail subsequently cracked due to 
stress overload. 
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Case Study: Failure due to Environment • 
• Sections of wire rope from the 
lightning protection system at 
the launch pads were submitted 
for inspection to determine 
potential future usage of similar 
wire rope2. 
- Wire rope was type 316 stainless 
steel. 
- Installed in 2001 and ;emoved in 
2008. 
• Visual observation of the wire 
rope revealed damage that was 
due to two separate 
environmental problems: 
corrosion and possible lightning 
damage. 
lSalazur. V.L. . "Analysis of Wire Rope from Launch Complexes (LC) 39A and 39B," Repcn KSC·MSL-2009·008 1, 2009 . 
Case Study: Failure due to Environment • 
• Visual observation revealed 
locally melted and fused wires. 
• SEM examination of one of 
these areas of damage revealed 
a melted bead of metal. 
• Metallographically prepared 
cross-section of the damaged 
area indicated that five of the 
nineteen wires in the strand 
were affected. 
- Typical weld-like dendritic 
microstructure. 
- Microhardness measurements 
indicated that the heat affected zone 
was extremely localized. 
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Case Study: Failure due to Environment 
• Stereomicroscopic inspection of one of 
the ropes revealed pitting of 
approximately one quarter of the wires 
in one of the strands of the wire rope 
cross-secti on. 
- The morphology and composition of 
deposits observed within the pit via 
SEMIEDS were typical of solid rocket 
booster (SRB) combustion product deposit. 
- Approximately two-thirds of the interior 
portion of the cross-section was removed. 
• Grain boundary attack causeq the 
wormhole-like pitting of the interior of r-.:....--=.--~-......--:;:::...;:;:= 
the wire since the corrosion mechanism 
acted longitudinally with the grain 
structure. 
Failure due to Maintenance 
• 
• 
• The crawler transporter is used to move the shuttle 
transportation system to the launch pad after mating operations 
in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). 
• A spherical bearing from a steering cylinder of the crawler 
transporter (CT) was submitted for failure analysis when a 
crack was observed during maintenance3. 
• The spherical bearing was composed of AISI E521 00 bearing 
steel (UNS G52986). 
' Salazar. V.L.., "Failure AnalYSIs of II Spherical Bearing from Crawlerrrrnnspcrter I 
(CT· I) 0 ·2 Steering Cylinder: ' Report KSC·MSL·200S·021S . 200S. 
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Failure due to Maintenance • 
• The cleaned fracture surface displayed 
conchoidal crack-arrest lines that 
indicated progressive failure. 
• No microscopic indication of fatigue 
striations were observed via SEM; 
however, the fracture features were 
consistent with progressive failure in 
high strength steel. 
• Samples of used and unused lubricant were taken for analysis. 
- The used samples were a darker brown color than the 'unused sample 
and were heavily contaminated with environmental particles (e.g. , rock, 
sand). 
- Analysis of the samples using Fourier transformed infrared 
spectroscopy (Ff-IR) indicated that the used samples were oxidized . 
Failure due to Maintenance 
• The bearing failed in a 
progressive manner, likely 
the result of misalignment. 
• 
• The lubricant analysis 
indicated severe degradation 
due to age and contamination 
with environmental particles. 
• The misalignment could have 
been caused by the failure of 
the grease to properly transfer 
the load, leading to the 
bearing binding in its race. 
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Failure due to Design • 
• During installation of the new launch pad lightning 
protection towers for the Constellation program, 
inspectors found toe cracks along a total of nine welds 
on all three of the towers at various elevations4. 
• The pipes were specified as ASTM A 500, Grade B, 
carbon steeP. 
"WrighL M.e.. "P.lilure Analysis 0( Cnct.ing alOOI Weld$ 00 the laWJCb ecrq,lclI (LC) 398 COI11lellatm Lighlning Protection Towers:' Report KSC-MSIAOOS·043 I. 2008. 
'~IM Slandard A 5OOf!iOOM. "Standard Specificalioo ror CoId·Fonntd Welded and SeamlCSl CIWbon Steel St.ructuml Thbing in ROWKb and ShapeJ.~ MIM lntem:IIKln:iL Welt 
Conshohocken. PA, 2009, 001: 1O. 152OiAOSOO~M-09, www.aslm.orl. 
Failure due to Design 
• Demarcations observed on the fracture 
surface were not beach marks typically 
associated with fatigue; rather the marks 
were due to superficial corrosion 
product build-up on the fracture surface, 
as determined with SEMIEDS. 
• Failure was due to overload with a 
geometrical stress state constraint, 
which prevented the material to 
plastically deform. 
• The crack initiated near the toe of the 
lO-in. pipe weld at the joint transition 
where a stress concentration was 
expected due to weld geometry. 
• 
-
--
' .... . 10 
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Failure due to Design 
• The crack profile and fractography indicated that the joint failed 
due to stress overload during fit-up . 
• The reasoning behind the categorization of this failure is due to 
the lessons learned from this failure. 
- The lightning towers stand 500 feet tall with 100 foot high fiberglass masts. 
- Access to the lightning tower is with a rung ladder, with four walkways 
approximately every 125 feet. 
- Routine inspection and maintenance of the towers, along with troubleshooting of 
any problems that may arise, will be difficult with the current access configuration. 
The Role of Age in Failure • 
• One factor that plays a role in every failure analysis, 
and one of the first questions asked in the course of 
an investigation, is the age of the component. 
• The age of the part can aid in the determination of 
the cause of failure. 
• A survey of jobs was performed for the past three 
years by the NASA Materials Failure Analysis 
section. 
- Average service life of 17.5 years . 
- Over one third of the failure 
analysis cases are for new 
hardware and over one third of the 
failure analysis cases are for 
hardware that is over 20 years old. 
• N~w(less (han) months) 
• Leu than !I years 
. 5-9}'tau 
. IO- 14y~au 
.20 ytan and ovt'/' 
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Conclusion • 
• The results have implications for the present state 
of work at KSC. 
- The Shuttle program has been in operation for almost 
30 years, and the age of the hardware and ground 
support equipment is at one of the peaks for failure. 
- As the Shuttle program concludes and new programs 
begin at KSC, the need for failure analysis is at its 
most critical point on two fronts. 
• With vigilant failure analysis, NASA can obviate 
failure and continue flying safely. 
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• ' -' • - INTI~OI>lJCTION . , 
History has shown that failures can occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn Crom 
those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The information that we 
gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of 
veruc:les more efficient and safe. The Failw-e Ana1ysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in the Materials 
Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs meta1Jurgical, mechanical, electrical, and 000-
metallic materials failurt lUlalyses and accident investigations on rught hardware and ground support 
equipment for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), Constellation, and Launch Services 
Programs. The majority of failures eM typically be attributed to one or more oflhe following causes: failure 
due to fabrication problems, failure due to environmental problems, failure due to maintenance problems, 
and failure due to design problems. 
~" • !-AILURE DlJE TO FABRICATION • 
The Rotation Handling Fixture is used to lift the 
modules of the ISS into a \'acuum chamber in order to 
perform leak chocks. A payload canister rail from the 
Rotation Handling Fixture was submitted for failure 
anwysis when a <:rack was observed on the top of the rail 
during installauon (Fig. 1)1, The rail was specified as AISI 
L.: • .....:. :......;.:.....: • .....:.:......;::. . .... 41 40 51cel (UNS G41400). 
"'" I. R.OUIion handIq tm.n (WI) '" ~ ......... Bil. • 
rwcetvod (riaN). The crack was opened in order to examine the 
fracture surface (Fig. 2). The surfaces were flat and had a 
small region of fracture around the edge of the surface. 
Plating was observed on one of the revealed surfaces and 
grinding marks were observed on the other surface. 
... 
Metallographic spetUntnS werc prepared from 
cross sections of tho rail (Fig. 3). Observation of the 
mmllographic specimens indicated that II; piece of metal 
was welded into iii notch cut in the base material . The fiU 
material wcs detennined to be a lOoo-series steel, and was 
the same size as machined notches that were located in six 
positions 00 the rail. 
The: payload canister rail failed due to improper 
fabrication techniques. Six cut notches were located on the 
rail. which were intended for instaJlation of the thrust 
block used to secure the payload. The rail had two cut 
notches that were not in accordance with the drawing, and 
were then filled with a low-strength, IOOO-series steel. The 
rail subsequently failed due: to stress overload. 
'11" • FAILURE nUE TO ENVIRONMENT _ 
Sections of wire rope from the: Lightning protection system at the launch pads were submitted for 
inspection to determine potentia] future usage of similar wire ropel. The wire rope was type 316 stainless 
stocl (UNS S316OO). and was installed in 200 I and removed in 2008. VISual observation of the wire rope 
revealed damage due to two separate environmental problems: COITosion and possible lightning damage. 
Damage due to lighmlng 
Several areas of damage were observed on the surface of the 
wire rope that were locally melted and fused wires (Fig. 4) . SEM 
examination of one of these areas of damage revealed a melted bead 
of metal that formed during a localized beating event. Observation of 
a metallograpbically prepared cross-section of the damaged area 
indicated that fi,'e of the nineteen wires in the strand were affected. 
The damaged area had a typical weld-like dendritic microstructure, 
confmning that the material had been melted,. Microhardness 
measurements indicated that the heat affected zone was extremely 
loealinx!. 
: ~ -~ 
1 
~ ..... 
'-.. ' .. -•. ~ .. '" ' 
. .., . 
" ' ~ . li.!L_ "1 j : 
Damage due to corrosion 
Stereomicroseopic inspection of one of the ropes revealed 
pitting of approximately one quarter of the wires in one of the 
strands of the wire rope cross-section (Fig. 5). The morphology 
and composition of deposits observed withln the pit via SEMfEDS 
were typical of solid rocket booster (S RB) combustion product 
deposit. A metallographicaUy prepared cross-section of a pitted 
wire indicated that approximately two-thirds of the interior portion 
of the cross-section was reme»·ed. The corrosion was likely due to 
chloride·induccd grain boundary attack of the stainless Sloel wire. 
The grain boundary attack caused the wormhole-like pitting of the 
interior of the wire since the corrosion mechanism acted 
longitudinally with the grain structure. 
ii" . FAILURE nUE TO MAINTENANCE • 
The crawler transporter is used to move the shutt1e to 
the launch pad after mating operations in the Vehicle Assembly 
Building (VAS). A spberical bearing from. steering cylinder 
of the crawler transporter was submitted for failure analysis 
when a cmck was observed during maintenance (Fig. 6)3. The 
spherical boariag assumes the horizau",1 load during the 
steering of one of the four individual truck assemblies. The 
bearing was composed of AISI E52100 boariag steel (UNS 
G52986). 
The revealed fracture surface was coated with grease 
and had a burnt odor when it was opened-evidence that the 
bearing was in oper1I:uon subsequent lO crack formation. The 
cleaned fracture surface displayed conchoidal crack-llCTest lines 
that indicated. progressive failure (Fig. 7). Although no 
microscopic indication of fatigue striations was observed, the 
fracture features were consistent with progressive failure in 
bigh Stron8th steel . 
Samples of used and unused lubncant were taken for 
analysis. The used samples were a darker brown color than the 
lUluscd sample and were heavily contaminated with particles. 
The compositions of the particles analyzed via SEMIEDS were 
consistent with corrosion product and environmental 
contaminants such as sand and rock fragments . Analysis of the 
grease samples using Fourier transformed infrared 
spectroscopy indicated that the used samples were oxidi1.cd. 
The bearing failed in a progressi\'e manner, likely the 
result of misalignment. The lubricant analysis indicated severe 
degradation due to age and contamination with environmental 
particles (Fig. 8). The misalignment could have been caused by 
the failure of the grease to property transfer the load, leading to 
the bearing binding in iu race. 
fll&. 6. I..oc.aonof ...... qclInd«(Mft)lIIdllwcr.uJ 
tpIIcrbI~ (rieN ). 
.,.. 1. CondIoidaI wD IIftIII nwb (yeID.-) wen obMn-ood 
tmaIIIlIIriI froIIIlbooriP (blue arrow). 
FiI- •. "Tbogw, .... tr ..... __ 112I11i1lb1pounc1 
1oId_.~IO .... ~~. 
!it' " . . FAILURE nUE TO nESIGN . 
F" .. l o. !lpociNaI l"Orf1) "' S~2(~) Mre*"'-'l 
ftt1Ni!I£~-",, (IIlpj. 
During installation of the new launch pad 
lightning protection lOwers for the Constellation 
program, inspectors found toe cracks along a total of 
nine welds on all three of the towers at various 
elevations (Fig. 9)"'. The pipes were specified as 
ASTM A SOO, Grade B, carbon steel'. Two 
specimens were sectioned from 8 representative 
coupon removed from one of the towers (Fig. 10). 
SEM examination of the Specimen 1 fracture 
surface revealed evidence of brittle and ductile 
(mixed-mode) fractw-e. Demarcations observed on 
the Specimen 2 fracture surface were not beach 
marks typically associated with fatigue; rather the 
marks were due to superficial corrosion product 
build-up on the fracture surface. as determined via 
SEWEDS. 
A cross section from the coupon was prepared for 
metaUographic examination (Fig. II). The crack initiated 
ncar the toe of the IO-in. pipe weld at the joint transition 
where II stress concentration 'was expected due to weld 
geometry. The microstructure of the weld and base metal 
was typical for a plain carbon steel fillet wcld. 
The crack profile and fractography indicated that the 
joint failed due to stress overload during fit·up. The 
reasoning behind the categorization of this failure is due to 
the lessons learned from this failure. The lightning towers 
slMd 500 feet toll with 100 foot hish fibergl ... mllSts (Fig. 
12). The orny access to the lightning tower is with a rung 
ladder on one side of each tower, with four walkways 
approximately evCT)' 125 feet . Routine inspection and 
maintenance of the towers and the welds, along with 
troubleshooting of any problems that may arise. will be 
difficult with the current access configuration. 
fi ' " -CONCLUSION - HIE ROLE OF AGE _ 
One factor that plays a role in every failure analysis, and one of the flt'St questions asked in the 
cow-se of an investigation, is the age of the component. The failure of a new part may indicate a 
problem with the design or fabrication of II component. The failure of a part that is 20 years or older 
may signify a problem with maintenance. In several cases, age itself can be the cause of the failure; for 
example in many cases where fatigue or corrosion is the failure mechanism, orny routine inspection and 
replacement em mitigate these failures prior to larger system failure. 
A survey of jobs performed over the past three year.; by the NASA Materials Failure Analysis 
scx:tlon was completed in order to determine the distribution of component age at failure. So far, over 
50 failure analysis cases have been reviewed. For some of the ground support equipment at KSC, 
documentation of the age is not available, especially when the component has been in sen'ice for over 
20 years. These cases have nOl been incorporated into the distribution at this time in order to perl'oon 
further research to determine the age oftbe components. 
Over the past throe years, the Materials Failure Analysis section bas performed failure analysis 
for components with an average service: life of 17.5 years for cases where the age of the component was 
known and that the component was not new (less than 3 months old). Over one third of the failure 
aDlllvsis cases arc for new hardware and over one third of the failure analysis cases are for hardware 
that ·is over 20 years old (Fig. 13). 
The results have implications for the present state of work at KSC. The Shuttle program hu 
been in operation for almost 30 years, aod the age of the hardware and ground support equipment is at 
one of the peaks for failure. As the ShuuJe program concludes and new programs begin at KSC. the 
need for failure analysis is at its most critical point on two fronts. With \'igilant failure analysis, NASA 
can obviate failure and continue flying safely. 
• ~t'\\' 0"5 than 3 months ) 
• Lt'S5 tban 5 ye-ars 
• S·9ytars 
_lo-l J yee.rs 
. 1 ~- 1 9 yf'8rs 
20 years and O\'er 
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